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Abstract:
In this paper, we demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in wage growth across firms
within industry, and across workers within firm in Belgium. This variation does not
appear to be consistent with simple measurement error stories, but rather seems to be
evidence of a more complex labor market.  We also empirically show how different the
wage and employment adjustment process looks at different levels of aggregation.
Résumé:
Dans ce travail, nous montrons le haut niveau d’hétérogénéité dans la croissance des
salaires entre firmes d’une même industrie et entre travailleurs d’une même firme. Ces
différences ne semblent pas être causées par de l’erreur de mesure, mais semblent plutôt
indicatrice de l’existence d’un marché du travail complexe. Nous montrons également les
différences entre les processus d’ajustement de l’emploi et des salaires à différents niveau
d’agrégation.2
1. Introduction
Imagine that shifts in product demand were the dominant force shaping changes
in wages and employment.  This might seem plausible if only because the alternative
case, for labor supply shifts, is so implausible.  We know that employment growth at the
firm level, as well as the underlying gross flows of job creation and destruction, or of
accessions and separations, are idiosyncratic.  Almost all of the variation in these gross
and net employment flows is orthogonal to occupational structure, to region, to broad
industry, and to the aggregate fluctuations of the macro-economy (Leonard, 1987).
Moreover, firm or establishment growth rates tend to be negatively auto-correlated.
Shifts in labor supply predict a different pattern.  Aside from wars, the black
plague, the Marial boat-lift, and some strikes, we think of supply-shifts as being
ponderous and pervasive, developing over years and affecting the economy broadly.  If
shifts in labor supply were the dominant force behind employment change, we would
expect to see employment changes that were widely shared across the economy,
persistently auto-correlated from year to year, and negatively correlated with wage
changes.  Instead the employment change we see at the firm or establishment level is
idiosyncratic, high-frequency, and negatively auto-correlated.
Labor demand shocks could produce these patterns.  This paper explores evidence
of the relative importance of demand, supply, and measurement-error in determining
wages and employment.  Because the employment fluctuations seem too heterogeneous
and transient to be caused by supply shifts, we focus on the adjustment path through
product markets.  The next section sketches the employment and wage implications of
some common labor market models.  To describe these changes, we use longitudinal
matched employee-employer data, described in Section 3.  Section 4 characterizes the
extent of employee, firm, and job-match turnover.  All are substantial.  A broad measure
of wage rigidity is the degree to which aggregate wages adapt through the entry and exit
of firms and workers.  If most adjustment occurs not within firm or job-match, but rather
through changes in the composition of industries and work-forces,  that indicates a high
relative cost of adjusting wages within ongoing firms and job-matches.
While we find substantial worker and firm turnover, it has little net effect on wage
growth or its variance.  High infant mortality rates for new firms and for new job-matches3
mean that the wages of exits look very much like the wages of the entrants they just
recently were.  The net effect of this churning is small because the two (entry and exit)
offset each other.
Finding that most wage change occurs within ongoing firms and job-
matches rather than through changes in the population of firms or workers, we turn in
Section 5 to industry patterns of wage change.  Product market shocks could be expected
to cause broad wage changes within the associated labor market.  We search across
different levels of disaggregation for the common wage changes of a labor market.
Because of differences in cost-structures, the labor demand of all firms within an
industry need not respond identically to a common product demand shift, so evidence on
the heterogeneity across firms of net or gross employment flows need not preclude firms
in the same market facing the same shock.  But if they are in the same market and face
the same demand shock, we would expect to see a common wage effect.  That is one
definition of a labor market.
We do not find any aggregation of firms into industries, or of workers into firms,
in which the common component of wage changes dominates heterogeneity within units.
We end by examining the adjustment paths of wages and employment at the firm
level.  Section 6 shows the time series properties of these changes, and the correlation
between wage and employment change.  We demonstrate the pitfalls of attempting to
infer the underlying micro-economic behavior from more aggregated data.  The
agglomeration effects are large enough to undercut attempts to infer micro behavior from
macro patterns, or vice versa.
2.  Some Theoretical Predictions of Wage Growth
A Simple Measurement-Error Model
This paper will demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in wage growth.  It is
natural to suspect measurement error (M.E.), and it is worthwhile to consider the
implications of M.E. before delving into other possible interpretations of our results with
more substantive implications.4
While M.E. is a natural suspect for heterogeneity, there are some a priori reasons
to discount it here.  First, the data comes not from a survey, but from administrative
records.  The taxes paid by employers and the Social Security benefits received by
employees are direct functions of the wage date used here.  Unlike the usual survey
situation, employers have a direct financial interest in correcting positive M.E., and
employees have a direct financial interest in correcting negative M.E.  To the extent that
it cares about the integrity of the system, the government itself has an interest in reducing
M.E.  Indeed, with some frequency we encounter evidence of administrative corrections.
Of course motives and mechanisms to correct errors may reduce but not preclude
errors.  Because there is no limit to the complexity of M.E. models, it is impossible to
conclusively test against all possible M.E.  We can and do test against a simple common
form of M.E.  Suppose the measured logarithms of individual wage levels, W, equals the
logarithm of the true wage, Z, plus an i.i.d. measurement error:
Wit = Zit + eit
First note that the law of large numbers states that as N, the number of individuals
in the aggregate, increases, the signal to noise ratio increases.
Now the change in the logarithm of measured wages over time is:
DWit = DZit + Deit .
If Z does not change, then this predicts that the correlation of wage growth rates
will be negatively correlated – ½ in adjoining years and zero for years more than one year
apart.
Finally, M.E.’s only real effect should be on the researchers that it misleads.  If
the wage changes we observe here are purely artifacts of M.E., then by definition they
can have no impact on market behavior.  In other work (Leonard and Van Audenrode,
1993) we observe significantly faster wage growth in firms receiving government
subsidies.  We also observe lower turnover rates in firms with steeper wage profiles.  In a5
following section, we shall consider the correlation between wage and employment
changes, a correlation predicted to be zero if either of them represents M.E.
Equity Theories
Equity theories posit some (unspecified) comparison group that a worker looks to
judge whether his wage is fair.  A wage perceived to be unfairly low results in loss of
morale and of output.  The endogenous nature of the wage comparison group, the effect
of "unfairly" high wages, and the impact of mobility and choice are not fully considered
in these models.  They do however predict a tendency toward common wage changes
within comparison groups.  The theory is only testable if a comparison group is specified.
Our natural comparison group, among the infinite possibilities, is the group of workers
within the same establishment.  Strong firm wage effects are consistent with this testable
version of equity theories.
Industrial Relations
Scholars of industrial relations have long stressed the rule of institutional factors
in shaping wage structure.  "Orbits of coercive comparison," "wage gradients" and "wage
contours" have long been described in industrial relations studies that label the historical
pattern of relative wages across industries.  These studies can be considered antecedents
of equity theory with the comparison group specified by direct institutional knowledge.
Unions act to reduce wage inequality within firms, across firms within industry.
Descriptions of European unions as stronger than their counterparts in the US imply
greater uniformity as unions attempt to take wages out of competition through collective-
bargaining and through government regulation.  One expects to see little individual
worker heterogeneity in wage growth within firm, or firm heterogeneity within industry.
3. The Longitudinal Matched Employer-Employee Data
We use longitudinal matched employer-employee data for the population of
private employment in Belgium in the years 1983, 1984 and 1985.  We calculate the
average daily earnings of each worker at each firm each year, and use this in the6
subsequent analysis.  We also calculate the total days worked at each firm each year for
use in our measure of employment growth.
4. A Typically Inflexible Western European Economy
After more than a decade of double-digit unemployment and weak aggregate job
growth, it has become common to describe the economies of Western Europe as ensnared
in short-sighted regulations that hinder job creation and forestall job destruction.  Besides
directly raising the cost of terminating an employment spell, labor market flexibility is
also reduced by collective bargaining, institutions and national laws that limit wage
adjustments.  Product market policies also affect the labor market.  Industrial subsidies to
failing companies reduce the incentive to moderate wages and reallocate jobs.
Despite these policies to promote a more sclerotic and ossified Europe, jobs and
firms continue to be born and to die at substantial rates (see Table 1).  Of all private
establishments in existence (with at least one paid employee) in 1983, more than one in
five had ceased to exist by 1985.  Note that this 21% extinction rate should not include
mergers and acquisitions.  Perhaps more remarkable for a paragon of Eurosclerosis
(Belgium has been a league leader in the duration of unemployment) is the establishment
birth rate:  21.8% of all the establishments in existence in 1985 had come into existence
after 1983.  While these rates may be below those of the U.S., they still reveal an active
margin of substantial establishment entry and exit concentrated among small firms.  The
difference between large established employers and new small employers appears greater
in Belgium than in the US. While job and firm turnover among large firms is dampened
in Belgium compared to the US, the cross-country differences among small firms are
muted.  
A high infant mortality rate for new firms  (and for new employment spells)
means that the characteristics of establishments (and employees exiting employment
spells) will look much like those of the establishments that enter (and employees that
begin employment spells).  In this case, both entering and exiting establishments tend to
be about 1/3 smaller than ongoing establishments.7
The entry and exit of establishments are themselves significant factors in the
creation and destruction of jobs.  In other words, to understand employee turnover it
helps to understand employer turnover. Roughly between 5 and 10 percent of new
employment spells are in new establishments. A similar percent of ending employment
spells are in dying establishments.  One can, of course, make those rates as small or as
large as one likes by compressing or expanding the time frame.  As in the U.S., most job
turnover occurs in ongoing establishments.
Each year about one in every six Belgian employment spells comes to an end or
begins.  Again, because of high infant mortality rates for new job matches, these are
tightly linked events.  These rates are also higher in smaller establishments.  This reflects
both the higher turnover rates of the establishments themselves, as well as the wage
premium paid at larger establishments.
Labor markets adjust through the reallocation of workers across firms.  The more
mobile workers are, the less pronounced the wage differential required to promote this
reallocation and the closer the approximation to a perfectly competitive market.  Of the
workers in private employment in both 1983 and 1985, 87.5 percent were in the same,
continuous, employment spell.  That means that more than 6 percent of workers move
from one employer to another during a year.  Again this rate is lower than in the U.S., but
it suggests an active labor market with enough mobility to place pressure on competitive
wage differentials.  There are 10 to 13% more spells than workers in any year both
because of this movement from one employer to the next, and because a small proportion
of workers hold multiple concurrent jobs.
The Wage Adjustment Process: Adaptation or Extinction
Consider two extremes of wage rigidity.  In the first, wages are perfectly flexible
and fully and immediately change to re-equilibrate in response to shifts in demand or
supply.  Such supply and demand shifts would then result in widely shared wage changes
within a labor market.  At the other extreme lies a putty-clay model of wage adjustment.
Nominal wage paths once set do not change.  The only mechanisms for aggregate wages
to respond to supply or demand shifts is through inflation of the turnover of workers and8
firms.  Worker and firms whose wages have become too high exit, and low wage workers
and firms enter.  Diffused wage changes are a sign that the cost of wage adjustment
within firms are relatively low.  Aggregate wage changes that occur primarily through
firm and worker turnover indicate that it is costly to change wages within firms.
We disaggregate the growth of mean wages in the sample between 1983 and 1985
into wage growth among stayers (employees who stay in the same firm) and changes due
to the changes in the composition of the workforce (entering and exiting firms, and
workers beginning and ending employment spells) as follows:
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all the workers holding a job in 1985. This measure can be decomposed as the following

















85 , 85 ,
85
_
, where S represents the number
of workers staying within the same firm between 1983 and 1985, and E represents the
number of workers starting a new spell of employment (new entrants and jobs switchers)
in 1985. A comparable decomposition can be performed on the 1983 mean log wage,
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, where L is the number of
worker ending their spell of employment in 1983. The change in mean log wage can be
written as:
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captures the impact of the approximation, i.e. the variation in the proportion of stayers
and leavers between the two years. An additional decomposition can be performed within
entrants to distinguish entrants into new firms and entrants into existing firms, and to
distinguish between leavers because of the death of the firm and others.
Most wage adjustment takes place in continuing employment spells within
continuing firms.  Between 1983 and 1985, the mean log wage increased by .069.  Table9
2 breaks this aggregate 6.9 percent wage change down into a 6.4 percent point change
among stayers,  a 0.2 percentage point increase because entering firms have slightly
higher wages than exiting firms, a 0.5 percentage point increase because workers who
enter have slightly higher wages than do workers who exit, and a 0.2 percentage point
decline because the proportion of new firms and workers exceeds that of exiting firms
and workers. Most of the aggregate wage change occurs in continuing employment spells
among firms and workers that stay in the sample rather than through the entry and exit of
firms and workers, or the ending and beginning of employment spells.
Similar result holds when we weight wages by days worked per year (bottom panel
of Table 2) rather than weighting each employment spell equally irrespective of its
duration (top panel of Table 2).  In all categories considered, full-year workers are paid
more per day than are part-year workers.  The wages of full-time workers appear slightly
more rigid.
One reason for the minor impact of firm or worker exit and entry on the change in
aggregate wages is infant mortality.  Wages are about 25 percent lower at new firms, and
27 percent lower at other new employment spells, than at continuing employment spells.
Although they control for no other factors, these are large differences.  Despite these
large differences between the active margin and the stable core, and the substantial rate of
entry into new employment spells (34% of all spells start within the past 2 years), worker
and firm turnover hardly change aggregate wage levels.  This is because the effects of
entry are largely offset by those of exit.  Both new firms and new employment spells
have high infant mortality rates.  In consequence, firms and workers that exit look very
much like those that enter.  Those that exit tend to be those which have recently entered.
In this case the rates of exit are similar to the entry rates, and the wage levels among exits
are similar to those among entrants.
Wages are 20 percent lower at exiting firms, and 17 percent lower at spells that
end for other reasons, than they are in spells that continue (on a days weighted basis).
That excessively high wages are harmful to the health of the firm does not imply that
most firms deaths are caused by high wages.  The low wages among exits and the
substantial exit rate concentrated among recent entrants are consistent with a high rate of
learning about mistakes and mismatches soon after entry10
5. Heterogeneous Wage Growth Within Industries and Firms
If a labor market is defined as the unit within which common wage changes are
commonly observed, then the heterogeneous wage changes we observe suggest the ideal
type is elusive in practice, at least within the units examined here.  We examine potential
labor markets at progressively finer degrees of industry disaggregation but always find
substantial remnant heterogeneity.
Table 3 shows a set of decompositions of the variance of wage growth for 1.7
million workers in continuing employment spells in firms whose industry could be
identified.  The top panel is for wage growth, the bottom panel is for the residual of wage
growth after controlling for individual sex, blue-collar, age, tenure and the squares of the
last two.  Each panel reports progressively finer disaggregation of industry, until in the
limit each firm is treated as a separate industry.  Suppose each firm operated in a single
industry.  Then if any level of industry disaggregation corresponded to a labor market, we
would expect to see evidence of that labor market here in the form of greater
commonality of wage changes.
As the level of disaggregation increases, the proportion of wage growth variance
accounted for by variation between rather than within units (industries) increases.
However, this is an unavoidable result, so meaningless by itself.  More than 98% of the
variation in individual wage growth occurs within industries whether defined at the 1, 2,
or 3 digit SEC level.  Even 3-digit industry is not of much use in accounting for variation
in individual wage growth.  The vast majority of wage growth variation occurs within
industry no matter how fine the dissaggregation.  At the extreme, if each firm is assumed
to be in a distinct industry, 83% of wage growth variation is still found within industry
(in this case: firm).
Labor economics predicts a number of forms of individual heterogeneity within a
firm.  Different investments or returns to general or specific human capital could create
heterogeneous wage growth, as could the revelation of information concerning
productivity.   In the absence of direct measures of productivity or of human capital, it
has become commonplace to use tenure and age as proxies. The tenure and age proxies
(together with their squares) typically used for human capital, together with individual11
controls for sex and broad occupational category have significant impacts on wages, but
still leave 82% of the variation in individual wage growth within firm, as the bottom
panel of Table 3 shows.
In some settings, one might also expect that occupations rather than industries
delineate labor markets.  Even so, once we disaggregate to the firm level the distinction
between industries and occupations may be minor. Each firm averages 15 employees who
are likely to be found in a small number of occupations.  In other words, the firm
becomes a useful proxy for occupation.  Perhaps, but the vast majority of wage growth
variation still occurs within form, and within broad occupational category.
Finer disaggregation of industry cannot reveal a labor market with homogeneous
wage growth.  Maintaining the assumption of one industry per firm, any such
dissagregation would be a linear combination of firms.  But even when each firm is
considered a separate industry, at most 18% of the variation in individual wage growth is
accounted  for by differences across firms.  Firms are by far the most important single
correlate of wage growth, but even so they leave much wage growth unaccounted for.
Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Wage Growth Industries
The list of factors that might affect wage growth is exceedingly long.  The subset
that is unobserved is only slightly shorter.  Here we explore, rather than test, differences
in the dispersion of firm and individual wage growth across industries.  To ensure that
firm wage growth is not affected by the entry or exit of workers, we limit the sample to
continuing spells of employment within a firm.  Firm wages then cannot change because
of changes in the identity of employees.  We control for wage growth due to age, sex and
location, so differences in individual or firm wage growth in Tables 4, 5, and 6 cannot be
due to the common returns to age, sex, or location.  To guard confidentiality only
industries with at least 25 firms are considered.  Questions of dispersion across units
become less meaningful as the number of units approaches either extreme: one unit per
economy or one unit per underlying observation.
In every one, two and three digit industry with at least 25 firms, more than 90% of
the variance in wage growth across employees is within rather than across firm.12
We are interested not only in the degree of wage growth and dispersion across
workers within firm, but also in the degree of wage growth dispersion across firm within
industries.  To reduce the impact of individual idiosyncrasies, and of measurement-error
at the individual level, we calculate the average within firm of individual wage growth
conditional on the economy-wide returns to individual age, sex and region.
In every 1, 2, or 3 digit industry with at least 25 firms, there is substantial
variation in wage growth across firms.  At the 1 digit SEC level, the standard-deviation of
firm mean residual wage growth ranges from 9.5 percent in construction to 23 percent in
finance.
Before considering substantive explanations for these differences across industry,
consider what these differences across industry imply for the null hypothesis that residual
wage growth variation represents measurement error.  The simple measurement-error
hypothesis does not predict systematic differences across industry that persist over time.
The ranking of industries from high to low wage growth dispersions is similar over
various time periods.
The simple measurement error hypothesis does predict that as the number of
workers within a firm increases to N, the variance of average firm wage growth should
fall by 1/N.  The null hypothesis that all residual wage growth is i.i.d. measurement error
does not fit the data. Taking the average of residual wage growth within firm hardly
reduces its standard-deviation.   Nor do industries with larger average firm size show
systematically lower dispersion across firms.  The standard-deviation of residual wage
growth falls when we take the firm averages but it does not fill the factor of 1/N
2
predicted by the measurement-error model.
While there are some cases, such as finance, where an industry has both high
dispersion across firms and low average size, in general there is no significant correlation
between wage growth dispersion and average firm size.
Consider then the substantive results in Table 4, 5 and 6.  First, there is substantial
dispersion across individuals in residual wage growth within nearly all industries.  Table
5 shows selected 4 digit SEC industries (blue-collar) and 3 digit industries (white-collar)
which we believe to be characterized by relatively homogeneous work forces.  Consider
for example, breweries or slaughter-houses.  We believe there is little dispersion in13
human capital or still requirements across plants, or across blue-collar workers within
plant in these highly disaggregated industries.  Nevertheless, the standard deviation
across workers is 9.5% in breweries and 12-19% in slaughter- houses.  Across firms the
standard deviations are 6.4 percent and 9.0 percent respectively.  In other words, to
encompass two-thirds of the 86 breweries (with and across 5C continuing blue-collar
employees each) requires a range of 12.8% in firm average wage growth.  This range
cannot be accounted for by employees or firm turnover, nor by differences in the age,
sex, or location of the employees.  On the product market side, slaughter-houses sell an
undifferentiated product with stable demand.
Breweries sell differentiated products.  In Belgium, brand preferences are handed
down from father to son, and both the total market and market shares are stable.  These
sectors have been largely unaffected in recent decades by changes in technology, in
tastes, in trade, or in market structure.
Table 7 shows the 2 digit industries at the extremes of the distribution of wage
growth variance.  The lower tail includes large scale manufacturing and mining industries
often with strong unions or a small number of firms.  In contrast, the high-variance
industries are found in the service sector.
Dynamics
Here we examine the nature of the labor market adjustment process over time.
We show how important aggregation effects are by comparing auto-correlation matrices
of growth rates at the individual, firm, and 3,2, and 1 digit SEC industry levels.   The
most basic questions to ask concerning employment and wage changes are first, are they
just measurement-error, and second, do they reflect shifts in demand or in supply.
The simple measurement-error model predicts that growth rates in neighboring
years will be negatively correlated –  ½ .  Growth rates more than two years apart should
be uncorrelated.  Table 8 shows the auto-correlation matrices for individual wage growth
and residual wage growth (controlling for age, sex, tenure, calendar year, and broad
occupation). These do not match the patterns predicted by the simple measurement-error
model.14
There is little trend in individual wage growth, or in residual wage growth.  Past
wage growth is of little help in predicting future growth.  The correlation of wage growth
one year apart ranges from -.16 to +.14, far less in magnitude and often of the opposite
sign than the – ½  predicted by measurement-error. The shift in behavior after 1983 may
be associated with a change in government anti-inflationary policy intended to cap real
wage growth at the firm level.
The absence of trends in individual wage growth is surprising from the
perspective of many models.  After all, these are not asset prices. We do not expect any
innovation in the future value of human capital to be capitalized in today’s flow price for
labor services.  Human capital models predict steeper wage profiles where greater
investments have been made.
Increasing wage inequality has been observed in a number of developed
economies.  Trade and technology induced demand shifts are usually thought to be the
causes.  These forces are usually thought of as causing wages to adjust over a span of
years.  Increasing dispersion for such systemic reasons requires positively auto-correlated
wage growth at the individual level.  We do not see this.
Any model with quadratic adjustment costs predicts a drawn out process of partial
adjustment, and so positively correlated growth rates.  Fixed adjustment cost models
predict lumpy adjustment and so can support the negative auto-correlation seen after
1983.  We believe changes in labor supply, trade, or technology develop gradually over a
number of years, and so would predict positive auto-correlations.   Table 8 is then too
successful in presenting evidence in conflict with a number of different models.  Rather
than the common problem of having too many models that could fit the data, we find
ourselves in the unusual position of having one too few.
At the firm level there is less systematic behavior.  The top panel of Table 9
shows the auto-correlation matrix for average wage growth at the firm level.  All of these
auto-correlations are negative, all are significant at conventional levels (which means
little in such large populations), and all are small in magnitude.  Firms with mean wage
growth that is unusually fast one year tend to have below average wage growth in
subsequent years, but the magnitudes are minor.   There is also evidence (in regressions
not shown here) of an error correction process, or market equilibration process at work at15
the firm and individual level.  Firms and individuals that start with unusually high wage
levels subsequently have below average wage growth.  Again, the magnitudes are small.
As the level of aggregation increases (on the identical underlying micro data), the
auto-correlations change dramatically.  At the 1-digit SEC level, we see strong positive
auto-correlations.  This type of evidence has long been taken as evidence of slow and
costly adjustment.  It is mistaken to infer micro-behavior from the macro-patterns
(Bentollila and Bertola, Hamermesh).  As we disaggregate more, the magnitude of the
auto-correlations generally drop and then flip sign once we reach the firm level.  Again,
there is evidence of a shift in behavior after 1983.  By construction, none of the
differences across levels of aggregation can be due to entry or exit of workers from the
sample, although the movement of workers across units within the sample can affect
these correlations.  Disaggregating does not reveal evidence of labor market supply or
demand shocks that take more than one year to adjust to.
More importantly, the implicit weights differ across levels of aggregation.
The top panel of Table 9 gives equal weight to each firm.  The relative weight given to
small firms drops once we aggregate to industry level.  One interpretation of Table 9 then
is that larger firms show more persistence in wage growth and take longer to adjust than
do smaller firms.  This is consistent with greater bureaucratic restrictions within larger
firms, as well as with greater union power.
Table 10 repeats this analysis for employment growth.  Here the aggregation
patterns are simpler and clearer.  What is essentially uncorrelated at the firm level
becomes more strongly and positively correlated at more aggregated levels.  The slow
labor force adjustment traditionally observed at the macro level does not support an
inference of slow adjustment at the micro-level.  While aggregate employment may only
slow shift across industry lines, the mass of small firms appear able to quickly adjust their
employment.
A demand shift predicts positively correlated changes in wages and employment.
A supply shift predicts negatively auto-correlated changes in wages and employment.
Our prior is that supply shocks are an implausible source of transient and idiosyncratic
changes in employment and wages.  The competitive labor market model of course
predicts zero correlations of wage and employment changes at the firm level within a16
competitive market.  There is one wage level within a competitive market, and by
definition, all firms are wage-takers.
Contemporaneous wage and employment growth at the firm level tend to be
negatively correlated (Table 11).  By construction, none of this can reflect changes in
composition within each firm.  A growing firm tends to hire younger workers with lower
wages and faster wage growth.  A shrinking firm may layoff low tenure low wage
workers, although this is less often the case in Belgium than in the US.  The sample here
is limited to workers in the same firm in both years, so the identity of the workers within
each firm is held fixed.
In market clearing models, a negative correlation between employment and
wages happens when supply shocks hit. As we have already noted, because of their
nature, we do not believe that supply shocks can explain movements in wages which are
so firm specific. There exists a variety of non-market clearing models, however, which
would predict such relationship. Most models where wages are set by unions or insiders
on the firm's demand curve for labor would predict a negative correlation between
employment and wages, all else being equal. Rent seeking behavior (by unions or
insiders) might explain these idiosyncratic movements in wages are firm level, but this
would still leave substantial within firm heterogeneity in wage growth.
Employment growth tends to be followed by wage growth in the following year at
the firm level, but the magnitude is small. All of the off-diagonal elements are positive,
but small.  Once we aggregate, most of the correlations are positive, but few are
significant.
While the negative contemporaneous correlation deserves further investigation,
the magnitudes of generally positive correlations between wage and employment growth
at the firm level seem small enough that the model of these firms as wage-takers in a
competitive model seems a decent approximation.
Conclusion17
The results in this paper are simple, unfair, and disquieting.  It is a paper about (1
minus R-squared).  That perspective is inherently an unfair because the implicit standard
is impractical.  The social sciences cannot be expected to account for all of the variation
in human or firm behavior.  Rather we are successful when we can model and predict
some of the systematic parts.  We and others have previously shown evidence of
heterogeneity in employment growth rates at the firm level, but economics makes
stronger predictions for homogeneous wage changes than for homogeneous employment
changes within a labor market.  It is from this perspective that some of the results are
disquieting.
We demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in wage growth across firms within
industry, and across workers within firm in Belgium. This variation does not appear to be
consistent with simple measurement error stories, but rather seems to be evidence of a
more complex labor market.  We also empirically show how different the wage and
employment adjustment process looks at different levels of aggregation.
The overall picture is of a West European labor market (of the type typically
described as suffering from Eurosclerosis) that shows  wage and employment flexibility,
and substantial heterogeneity in wage and employment growth within detailed industries.18
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Present both years 2,072,265
Entering Database in 1985 380,191




Present both years 135,872
Entering Database in 1985 37,882




Spells continuing over both years 1,813,324
Spells Starting in 1985 946,927
Spells Ending in 1985 892,470
Wages
Mean Log. Wage in 1983 7.436 (.502)
Mean Log. Wage in 1985 7.505 (.497)
D Mean Log Wage .069
Mean D Log Wage – Continuing Employment Spells .097 (.180)
Mean D Log Wage – All Spells .102 (.278)22
Table 2:  Decomposition of Wage Growth:Individual Workers



























177,603 769,324 1,813,324 730,122 162,438
D Mean Log Wage .0968
DEntrants / Leavers .0232
DNew Firm /Dead Firm .0234
(standard deviation in parenthesis)
Decomposition of D Mean Log Wage   = .069
Changes due to:
D Mean Log Wage of Stayers: =  .064
D Mean Wage Entrants / Leavers =  .005
Entry and exit of Firms =  .002
D Proportion of Stayers/Entrants/New Firms = -.002














Mean Log Wage 1985 7.3924 7.3739 7.6393 - -
Mean Log Wage 1983 - - 7.5467 7.3802 7.3460
Number of Observations 177,603 769,324 1,813,324 730,122 162,438
D Mean Log Wage .0926
D Entrants / Leavers -.0063
DNew Firm /Dead Firm .0464
Decomposition of D Mean Log Wage   = .071
Changes due to:
D Mean Log Wage of Stayers: =  ..061
D Mean Wage Entrants / Leavers = -.002
Entry and exit of Firms =  .003
D proportion of Stayers/Entrants/New Firms =  .009
* Weights = number of days worked during the year.23
Table 3:  Decomposition of the Variance of Wage Growth
Continuing Spells Only
Wage Growth
Mean Wage Growth = .0966
Variance Wage Growth = .0289
N = 1,705,446*
Contribution to the Total Sum of Squares of Wage Growth
Grouping Within Between % Explained
by Between
1-Digit  SEC (N=10) 49,228.5 143.8 .003
2-Digit SEC (N=62) 48,993.7 378.6 .008
3-Digit SEC (N=263) 48,825.0 547.3 .011
Firm (N=115,473 ) 41,082.1 8,290.3 .168
Men – Women 49,368.4 3.9 .000
Blue Collar – White Collar 49,211.4 160.8 .003
Wage Growth Residual
Residual Computed after regression of Wage Growth on Age, Age squared, Tenure, Tenure Squared,
control for censored Tenure, Sex, and BC/WC Dummy.
Mean Residual = 0
Variance residual = .0281
N = 1,582,851*
Contribution to the Total Sum of Squares of Wage Growth Residuals
Grouping Within Between % Explained
by Between
1-Digit  SEC (N=10) 44,395.7  99.6 .002
2-Digit SEC (N=62) 44,161.9 333.6 .007
3-Digit SEC (N=263) 43,972.9 522.5 .012
Firm (N=115,473 ) 36,676.5 7,818.9 .176
* Observations in Firms whose industry could not be identified and observations with
missing values have been dropped.24
Table 4:  Dispersion in Wage Growth
Average wage growth at individual level not explained by age, sex or region. – by
industry
Blue collars – Continuing spells only
Number of Workers Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Agriculture, Fisheries (SEC 0) 7,605 .2087
Water, Energy (SEC 1) 2,256 .1155
Quarrying, Mining, Chemicals (SEC 2) 106,100 .1396
Steel (SEC 3) 158,916 .1247
Other Manufacturing (SEC 4) 196,795 .1323
Construction (SEC 5) 100,078 .1065
Sales (SEC 6) 110,130 .1846
Transportation (SEC 7) 55,219 .1899
Finance (SEC 8) 21,372 .2091
Other (SEC 9) 123,630 .1922
Average wage growth at firm level not explained by age, sex or region. – by industry
Blue collars- Continuing spells only
Number of Firms Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Agriculture, Fisheries (SEC 0) 2,698 .1730
Water, Energy (SEC 1) 14 .0981
Quarrying, Mining, Chemicals (SEC 2) 1,619 .1211
Steel (SEC 3) 3,948 .1029
Other Manufacturing (SEC 4) 10,658 .1336
Construction (SEC 5) 14,352 .0950
Sales (SEC 6) 26,539 .1787
Transportation (SEC 7) 3,297 .1446
Finance (SEC 8) 5,558 .2303
Other (SEC 9) 14,121 .188225
Table 5:  Dispersion in Wage Growth
Average wage growth not explained by age, sex or region. – by industry
Blue collars – Continuing spells only
Individual Level Firm Level











1 6,048 0.1838 2402 0.17136
2 852 0.3501 155 0.219
3 705 0.1546 141 0.1142
Quarrying, Mining, Chemicals
22 48,212 0.1324 96 0.10126
23 3,861 0.1479 126 0.09902
24 24,879 0.1340 984 0.13464
25 28,296 0.1521 403 0.10047
Steel
31 46,881 0.1517 2315 0.10233
32 28,153 0.1177 639 0.08807
34 40,271 0.1162 381 0.09748
35 30,479 0.0865 197 0.05355
36 10,645 0.1197 141 0.08167
37 2,033 0.1721 261 0.16813
Other Manufacturing
41 29,953 0.1543 3342 0.17214
42 22,221 0.1671 666 0.1072
43 45,034 0.1117 1013 0.10857
44 1,703 0.1692 131 0.15981
45 28,499 0.1438 1548 0.13309
46 22,499 0.0920 1573 0.09408
47 28,072 0.1177 1467 0.10598
48 11,606 0.1293 392 0.09777
49 7,208 0.1232 526 0.10671
Construction
50 100,078 0.1065 14352 0.09532
Sales
61 38,145 0.1551 8009 0.14704
62 2,503 0.1450 304 0.12938
63 65 0.2065 44 0.14465
64 19,120 0.1906 6022 0.19234
65 5,343 0.1866 1733 0.16111
66 28,795 0.2325 6219 0.22524
67 16,159 0.1423 4208 0.13893
Transportation
72 32,904 0.1421 2814 0.13578
73 410 0.1462 85 0.10154
76 14,679 0.2424 103 0.24252
77 2,761 0.1712 283 0.14862
Finance26
81 4,257 0.1857 466 0.229
82 974 0.1480 74 0.13703
83 15,044 0.2199 4688 0.23191
84 525 0.1820 113 0.19924
85 572 0.1636 217 0.2144
Other
91 12,604 0.1304 243 0.14344
92 12,346 0.2503 427 0.16044
93 15,363 0.2368 2462 0.20232
94 501 0.1307 82 0.11198
95 14,027 0.1666 1312 0.17876
96 22997 0.18829 2720 0.19697
97 4899 0.20671 746 0.21071
98 10672 0.15948 3267 0.15174
99 30221 0.17405 2862 0.20746
Industries with 25 firms or less have been deleted for confidentiality reasons27
Table 6:  Dispersion in Wage Growth – Selected Industries
Average wage growth at individual level not explained by age, sex or region. – by
industry
Blue collars – Continuing spells only
Number of Workers Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Total 20,826 .1790
Quarrying (SEC 2312) 1,218 .1730
Glass (SEC 2471) 4,478 .0981
Slaughter Houses (SEC 4121) 1,378 .1211
Milk Processing (SEC 4131) 5,40 .1029
Sugar Refinery (SEC 4202)  2,687 .1336
Breweries (SEC 4271)  4,822 .0950
Average wage growth at firm level not explained by age, sex or region. – by industry
Blue collars- Continuing spells only
Number of Firms Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Total 344 .0712
Quarrying (SEC 2312) 51 .0555
Glass (SEC 2471) 7 .0101
Slaughter Houses (SEC 4121) 110 .0904
Milk Processing (SEC 4131) 77 .0639
Sugar Refinery (SEC 4202) 13 .0346
Breweries (SEC 4271) 86 .0644
Average wage growth at individual level not explained by age, sex or region. – by
industry
White collars – Continuing spells only
Number of Workers Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Total 17,350 .1681
Pharmacies (SEC 643) 5,122 .1638
Clothing Retail (SEC 645) 10,089 .1698
Travel agencies (SEC  771) 2,139 .1706
Average wage growth at firm level not explained by age, sex or region. – by industry
White collars- Continuing spells only
Number of Firms Standard Deviation of Mean Wage
Residual
Total 4,168 .1656
Pharmacies (SEC 643) 1,907 .1511
Clothing Retail (SEC 645) 2,001 .1787
Travel agencies (SEC  771) 260 .161128
Table 7:  Industries with Highest and Lowest Variance in Wage Growth









Automobile Industry 35 197 0.05355
Other Transportation Equipment 36 141 0.08167
Metal Works 32 639 0.08807
Furniture 46 1573 0.09408








Chemicals 25 403 0.10047
Highest:
Other Services 96 2720 0.19697
Rentals (Goods) 84 113 0.19924
Leisure and cultural services 97 746 0.21071
Rentals (Housing) 85 217 0.2144
Restaurants and Hotels 66 6219 0.22524
Banks 81 466 0.229
Other Financial services 83 4688 0.23191
Other activities related to
transportation
76 103 0.2425229
Table 8: Intertemporal correlation of wage growth of Individuals
Stayers only.
N=1,146,704 individuals
Intertemporal Correlation of Wage Growth
Wage Growth in:
1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 .1374 .0386 -.0051 .0101
1982 .0788 -.0086 .0143
1983 -.1558 -.0098
1984 -.1106
Intertemporal Correlation of the Residual of Wage Growth*
Wage Growth in:
1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 .0937 .0216 -.0315 -.0106
1982 .0628 -.0344 -.0056
1983 -.1423 -.0017
1984 -.1022
* Residual obtained from a regression of wage growth (1981 to 1985) on age, age squared, sex, Blue/White
collar dummy, tenure, tenure squared, and 4 dummy variables for year.30
Table 9: Intertemporal Persistence of Wage Growth
Intertemporal correlation of wage growth of stayers
At Firm Level (N=84,951)
Wage Growth: 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000  - .0235***  -.0073*** -.0156***  .0112***
1982 1.0000   -.0308*** -.0122***  -.0225***
1983 1.0000 -.0902***  -.0227***
1984 1.0000  -.0883***
1985 1.0000
At 3-Digits SEC Level (N=262)
Wage Growth: 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000    .0215***   .1581***  .2130***  .2168***
1982 1.0000    .1709***  .1199*   .3146***
1983 1.0000 -.1335*   .2200***
1984 1.0000  -.2266***
1985 1.0000
At 2-Digits SEC Level (N=62)
Wage Growth: 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000    .8603***   .4838***  .2299*  .2216*
1982 1.0000    .5152***  .1285   .3211**
1983 1.0000 -.0945   .0778
1984 1.0000  -.2141*
1985 1.0000
At 1-Digits SEC Level (N=10)
Wage Growth: 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000 .9902*** .8593*** .3276 .5367*
1982 1.0000 .8508*** .3333 .6298**
1983 1.0000 .1271 .3621
1984 1.0000 .0697
1985 1.0000
***: Significant at the 1% level
**: Significant at the 5% level
*: Significant at the 10% level31
 Table 10 Intertemporal Persistence Employment Growth
Intertemporal correlation of employment growth
At Firm Level (N=84,951)
Employment
Growth
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000   .0619***   .0208***  .0086**  .0095***
1982 1.0000   -.0008*** -.0159***  .0150***
1983 1.0000 -.0088***  .0195***
1984 1.0000  .0476***
1985 1.0000
At 3-Digits SEC Level (N=262)
Employment
Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000   .4166***   .2216***  .1337**  .1142*
1982 1.0000    .3652***  .0077  .2414***
1983 1.0000  .0295  .5088***
1984 1.0000 -.0585
1985 1.0000
At 2-Digits SEC Level (N=62)
Employment
Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000 .5072*** .2453* .2195* .2580**
1982 1.0000 .5970*** .6025*** .5560***
1983 1.0000 .55241*** .4614***
1984 1.0000 .6574***
1985 1.0000
At 1-Digits SEC Level (N=10)
Employment
Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 1.0000 .9141*** .9665*** .9238*** .8916***
1982 1.0000 .9480*** .9777*** .9480***
1983 1.0000 .9480*** .9070***
1984 1.0000 .9861***
1985 1.0000
***: Significant at the 1% level
**: Significant at the 5% level
*: Significant at the 10% level32
Table 11:  Wage Growth and Employment Growth
Correlation between wage growth of stayers and employment growth (measured as growth in the number of
days worked) – dying and newborn firms excluded.
At Firm Level (N=84,951)
Wage Growth:
Employment Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 -.0859***   .0797***   .0207***  .0157*  .0067**
1982 .0441*** -.0682***   .0440***  .0150***  .0158***
1983 .0184*** .0658***  -.1356***  .0431***  .0130***
1984 .0104*** .0105*** .0334*** -.1276***  .0478***
1985 .0116*** .0167*** .0146*** .0240*** -.0697***
At 3-Digits SEC Level (N=262)
Wage Growth:
Employment Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981  .0140   .0385  .0847  .0656  .1034*
1982  .2891*** -.2486***  .0332  .0001  .0124
1983 -.0533 -.0056  .1651*** -.1445** -.1118**
1984 -.0585  .0728 -.2384*** -.0048  .1125*
1985 -.0048 -.0705  .0675  .0536 -.2463*
At 2-Digits SEC Level (N=62)
Wage Growth:
Employment Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 -.0054  .0281 .3204**  .0081 .2429*
1982 -.0202  .0378 .2666** -.1407 .1751
1983  .1995  .1606 .2790 -.1260 .0962
1984 -.0146 -.0015 .1344 -.1602 .0907
1985  .0391  .0860 .1697  .0114 .1595
At 1-Digits SEC Level (N=10)
Wage Growth:
Employment Growth:
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1981 .2158 .2486 .3335  .2202 .1937
1982 .0208 .0657 .1505 -.0769 .2472
1983 .0564 .1062 .1930  .1702 .2198
1984 .0391 .0704 .1108 -.0035 .2119
1985 .0394 .0642 .0669 -.0255 .2188
***: Significant at the 1% level
**: Significant at the 5% level
*: Significant at the 10% level